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Abstract A 1964 paper by John Bell gave the first demonstration that quantum
mechanics is incompatible with local hidden variables. There is an ongoing and
vigorous debate on whether he relied on an assumption of determinism, or instead,
as he later claimed, derived determinism from assumptions of locality and perfect
correlation. This paper aims to bring clarity to the debate via simple examples
and rigorous results. It is shown that the weak form of locality used in Bell’s 1964
paper (parameter independence) is insufficient for such a derivation, whereas an
independent form called outcome independence is sufficient even when weak local-
ity does not hold. It further follows that outcome independence, by itself, implies
that standard quantum mechanics is incomplete. It is also shown that an appeal
by Bell to the Einstein-Rosen-Podolsky argument to support his claim fails, via
examples that expose logical gaps in this argument. However, replacing the real-
ity criterion underpinning the argument by a stronger criterion enables a rigorous
derivation of both weak locality and determinism, as required for Bell’s 1964 paper.
Consequences for quantum interpretations, locality, and classical common causes
are briefly discussed, with reference to an example of local classical indeterminism.
Keywords locality · perfect correlation · determinism · outcome independence ·
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument · classical common causes
1 Introduction
Bell’s theorem, that there are no local hidden variable models that can reproduce
all quantum correlations [1,2], is one of the most surprising results of twentieth
century physics. It has important ramifications for both physics and metaphysics,
in not only underlying the security of a number of device-independent communica-
tion protocols such as quantum key distribution and random number generation,
but also ruling out naive classical interpretations of quantum probability [2].
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The mathematics required to prove Bell’s theorem is remarkably straightfor-
ward. However, there is one aspect of the assumptions used in Bell’s first exposition
that continues to generate differing opinions and vigorous debate [3]–[26]: do the
assumptions of locality and perfect correlation made in his 1964 paper necessarily
imply that certain measurement outcomes must be predetermined, or does such
determinism represent a third assumption?
It may be noted that the answer to this question is unimportant in one sense:
later generalisations of Bell’s theorem do not rely on assuming perfect correla-
tion nor determinism [2]. Nevertheless, the question remains of strong interest for
several reasons. First, there is no general consensus on the answer. For example,
while Wigner wrote that Bell postulated both deterministic hidden variables and
locality [3] (see also [4,5]), Bell himself later claimed that determinism was in fact
inferred rather than assumed in his 1964 paper [6], and the debate has only inten-
sified since then. Second, an appeal by Bell to the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)
incompleteness argument [27] to support his claim puts the latter argument itself
into question. Finally, the validity of Bell’s claim would suggest that there is no
choice between giving up determinism or giving up locality in interpreting quan-
tum phenomena, i.e., that it would be compulsory to give up locality [9,28]—a
conclusion that is strongly contested in its own right (see, e.g., [29]–[36]).
With the aim of making a clear and concise contribution to these issues, this
paper is guided by the following quote from an excellent early discussion on the
subject by van Fraassen:
“I have made an effort to present the deduction . . . shorn of all superflu-
ous mathematical technicalities and woolly interpretative commentary. (A
reader as yet unfamiliar with the literature will be astounded to see the
incredible metaphysical extravaganzas to which this subject has led.)” [7]
In particular, attention will be focused on what can be proved in a simple yet
rigorous manner, and what can be disproved via simple counterexamples, whilst
avoiding woolly assertions and metaphysical extravaganzas.
In section 2 the only explicit sense of locality supported by Bell’s 1964 pa-
per is recalled, and shown to be too weak for deriving determinism for perfectly
correlated measurement outcomes (Proposition 1). In contrast, an assumption of
outcome independence (related to the existence of classical common causes) is suf-
ficient to derive determinism, whether or not weak locality (or even experimental
free will) is valid, generalising a result of van Fraassen [7] (Proposition 2). Outcome
independence is also sufficient, by itself, to imply the incompleteness of standard
quantum mechanics (Proposition 3).
In section 3 the degree of support afforded to Bell’s claim by the EPR in-
completeness argument is examined. Two gaps in the EPR logic are identified via
simple counterexamples, implying that the argument is itself incomplete (Propo-
sition 4). However, a suitable strengthening of the EPR reality criterion closes
these gaps (Proposition 5), and further enables a rigorous derivation of both weak
locality and determinism as required for Bell’s 1964 paper (Proposition 6).
Implications for quantum interpretations are noted in section 4, and the neces-
sity or otherwise of nonlocality in quantum mechanics is discussed with reference
to a classical example of nondeterministic evolution. Conclusions are given in sec-
tion 5.
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2 Locality, perfect correlation, and outcome independence
2.1 Weak locality (parameter independence)
Bell spells out his intended sense of locality in the introduction to his 1964 pa-
per [1]:
“It is the requirement of locality, or more precisely that the result of a mea-
surement on one system be unaffected by operations on a distant system,
with which it has interacted in the past, . . . ”.
It is applied in his section 2, in the context of Stern-Gerlach measurements, as
“Now we make the hypothesis, and it seems one at least worth considering,
that if the two measurements are made at places remote from on another,
the orientation of one magnet does not influence the result obtained with
the other.”
Finally, it is the combination of determinism with this sense of locality that he
argues is incompatible with quantum mechanics, as per the first sentence of his
Conclusion:
“In a theory in which parameters are added to quantum mechanics to de-
termine the results of individual measurements, without changing the sta-
tistical predictions, there must be a mechanism whereby the setting of one
device can influence the reading of another instrument, however remote.”
The last quote might suggest that Bell assumes both determinism and locality
to obtain a contradiction with quantum mechanics. However, he later claimed that
determinism is derived in his 1964 paper as a direct consequence of locality for the
case of perfect correlations (giving rise to the debate mentioned in section 1). Bell’s
claim is examined further below. For now, we need only note it must be possible to
mathematically formulate Bell’s sense of locality without reference to determinism,
if the latter is to be inferred rather than assumed. That is, a statistical formulation
of locality is required.
To obtain such a formulation, let x and y label possible measurements which
may be made in two separate regions of spacetime, having respective outcomes
labeled by a and b, and let p(a, b|x, y) denote the joint probability density for
these outcomes. If λ denotes any further statistical variables of interest—arising,
e.g., from a physical or mathematical model of the measurements—then it follows
from the basic rules of probability that
p(a, b|x, y) =
∑
λ
p(a, b, λ|x, y) =
∑
λ
p(a, b|x, y, λ) p(λ|x, y). (1)
Here summation is replaced by integration over any continuous range of λ. The
locality of such a model, in the sense spelled out in the introduction to Bell’s 1964
paper and quoted above, can now be rigorously formulated as
Definition 1 (Weak locality) : The probability distribution of the result of a
measurement in one region is unaffected by measurement operations in a distant
region, i.e.,
p(a|x, y, λ) = p(a|x, λ), p(b|x, y, λ) = p(b|y,λ), (2)
for all x, y, λ.
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This property is called weak locality here to distinguish it from other possible
notions of locality, and is most easily justified when the regions are spacelike sepa-
rated. It is also known as ‘hidden locality’ [7], ‘locality’ [37] and, more commonly,
‘parameter independence’ [38]. Importantly, it is the only statistical formulation
of locality that is explicitly supported by Bell’s 1964 paper.
2.2 Determinism does not follow from weak locality and perfect correlation
As mentioned above, Bell claimed in 1981 that determinism was not assumed in
his 1964 paper, but was logically inferred [6]:
“My own first paper on this subject . . . starts with a summary of the EPR
argument from locality to deterministic hidden variables. But the commen-
tators have almost universally reported that it begins with deterministic
hidden variables.”
However, the only explicit argument for determinism in that first paper is supplied
by just two sentences, in the context of measurements on two perfectly correlated
spins σ1 and σ2 [1]:
“Now we make the hypothesis, and it seems one at least worth considering,
that if the two measurements are made at places remote from on another,
the orientation of one magnet does not influence the result obtained with
the other. Since we can predict in advance the result of measuring any com-
ponent of σ2, by previously measuring the same component of σ1, it follows
that the result of any such measurement must actually be predetermined.”
Thus, it would appear that determinism is inferred as a logical consequence of
weak locality and perfect correlation. The ensuing debate in the literature arises,
at least in part, from a simple observation that undermines this argument [15,25].
Proposition 1 :
weak locality + perfect correlation 6=⇒ determinism. (3)
That is, Bell’s claim certainly does not hold for the only form of locality explicitly
supported in his 1964 paper: weak locality is too weak.
To demonstrate the above proposition, consider two particular measurements,
x0 and y0, that have a common range of possible values for their respective out-
comes a and b. Perfect correlation of these outcomes then corresponds to
p(A = B|x0, y0) = 1, (4)
where A and B denote the random variables corresponding to outcomes a and
b. It follows that proposition can be demonstrated via any model of correlations
satisfying Eqs. (1), (2) and (4) such that the outcomes of measurements x0 and
y0 are not predetermined by the model. The simplest such model is one for which
λ takes a single fixed value, λ0 say, and only one measurement is possible in each
region, x0 and y0 say, each with n possible outcomes. Then the joint measurement
distribution defined by
p(a, b|x0, y0) = p(a, b|x0, y0, λ0) := n−1δab (5)
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trivially satisfies Eqs. (1), (2) and (4) (with p(λ0|x0, y0) = 1), and yet is clearly
not deterministic for any n > 1.
Note that it is irrelevant whether or not the above counterexample has an
underlying model which is deterministic (indeed, this is trivially the case for any
given joint probability distribution p(a, b|x0, y0), perfectly correlated or otherwise):
Bell’s prima facie claim is that determinism, rather than its mere possibility, is
inferred from locality and perfect correlation alone. Counterexamples can also
be easily constructed for continuous outcome ranges (e.g., with x0 and y0 cor-
responding to perfectly correlated classical phase space measurements), and for
multiple measurement settings (e.g., based on simple models of ‘no-signalling’ cor-
relations [39,40]).
2.3 Determinism does follow from outcome independence and perfect correlation
We have from Proposition 1 that determinism can only be inferred from perfect
correlation via some assumption other than, or possibly in addition to, weak lo-
cality. For example, in his 1981 paper Bell interchangeably uses the terms ‘local
causality’, ‘local explicability’, and ‘action-at-a-distance’ for the condition
p(a, b|x, y, λ) = p(a|x, λ) p(b|y,λ) (6)
on models of correlations between distant regions (see also [41,42]). This condition
is strictly stronger than weak locality in Eq. (2) (the latter follows by summing
Eq. (6) over each of a and b), and is indeed sufficiently strong to derive determinism
for the case of perfect correlation [9,12]. Thus local causality is a candidate for a
missing additional assumption in Bell’s 1964 paper, albeit not actually supported
in any guise therein.
However, local causality is a far stronger assumption than is necessary for the
purpose of deriving determinism from perfect correlations: physical models need
in fact only satisfy the much weaker condition
Definition 2 (Outcome independence) : Any observed correlations between
measurement outcomes arise from ignorance of some further variable(s) λ, i.e.,
p(a, b|x, y, λ) = p(a|x, y, λ) p(b|x, yλ). (7)
for all a, b, x, y and λ.
This property has also been called, for example, ‘causality’ [7] and ‘complete-
ness’ [37], and implies that any correlation between observed outcomes is due
solely to the average over λ in Eq. (1). In particular, λ can be interpreted as a
classical common cause for the correlations. Outcome independence is logically
independent of weak locality, and clearly weaker than local causality in Eq. (6).
Indeed, simple substitution shows that local causality is equivalent to the combi-
nation of weak locality and outcome independence [37].
Importantly, in contrast to Proposition 1, one has
Proposition 2 :
outcome independence + perfect correlation =⇒ determinism (8)
with probability 1 (i.e., for a set of λ over which p(λ|x0, y0) sums or integrates to
unity).
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This result was first given for the case of discrete outcomes by van Fraassen [7] (a
formally equivalent result for two-valued outcomes was also given in Theorem 2
of[4]), but it does not appear to be well known. It is not discussed, for example, in
any of the contributions [8]–[26] to the debate other than [8,14]. It is extended here
to include the case of continuous outcomes, as proved at the end of this section.
Significantly, Proposition 2 is independent of whether or not weak locality as
per Eq. (2) is satisfied (although the latter is required for the further task of deriv-
ing Bell inequalities). Thus locality, in the only sense that is explicitly discussed
in Bell’s 1964 paper, is in fact irrelevant for the derivation of determinism from
perfectly correlated measurement outcomes! It is also worth noting the proposition
does not rely on making an assumption of measurement independence or experi-
mental free will (i.e., it is not assumed that p(λ|x, y) = p(λ)), nor even that the
‘common cause’ λ lies in the past.
As further observed by van Fraassen [7], Eq. (8) has a simple corollary of
fundamental interest, also proved below.
Proposition 3 :
outcome independence =⇒ incompleteness of standard QM. (9)
Thus an assumption of outcome independence by itself is sufficiently strong to
imply the incompleteness of the standard Hilbert space formulation of quantum
theory—regardless of whether or not weak locality or local causality or measure-
ment independence holds. Noting the discussion following Eq. (7), this result can
also be informally stated as some quantum correlations have no classical common
cause. Further, although not recognised by van Fraassen, it is independent of the
EPR incompleteness argument [27] (discussed in section 3), as is demonstrated by
the proof below.
In particular, Proposition 3 follows via consideration of any quantum wave
function that predicts perfect correlation between two measurements. Perhaps the
simplest example is one given by Einstein at the 1927 Solvay Congress and later
streamlined [43,44]: a superposition of a single particle in two regions, R1 and R2
say, with a wave function of the form
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|R1〉+ |R2〉) . (10)
Hence, if x0 is a measurement detecting whether the particle is in R1, and y0
is a measurement of whether the particle is in R2, it follows that the outcomes
(suitably labeled) are perfectly correlated. It follows from Proposition 2 that any
outcome-independent model of the detection statistics for this example must be
deterministic. But quantum theory predicts a nondeterministic (50%) probability
for either outcome. Hence, the wave function description is incomplete under an
assumption of outcome independence, as claimed.
Finally, to demonstrate Proposition 2, note that perfect correlation for the
outcomes of measurements x0 and y0 implies
∑
λ p(A = B|x0, y0, λ) p(λ|x0, y0)
= 1 via Eqs. (1) and (4). Hence
∑
λ[ 1 − p(A = B|x0, y0, λ) ] p(λ|x0, y0) = 0, and
so, noting each factor is nonnegative,
p(A = B|x0, y0, λ) = 1 (11)
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with probability 1. Now, for the case of discrete outcomes we have
p(A = B|x0, y0, λ) =
∑
a
p(a, a|x0, y0, λ). (12)
It follows via Eq. (11) and outcome independence as per Eq. (7) that∑
a
p(A = a|x0, y0, λ) [1− p(B = a|x0, y0, λ)] = 1− 1 = 0.
Thus, since each factor is nonnegative,
p(A = a|x0, y0, λ) [1− p(B = a|x0, y0, λ)] = 0 (13)
with probability 1. But p(A = a|x0, y0, λ) > 0 for at least one value, a = a′
say, and therefore p(B = a′|x0, y0, λ) = 1, implying p(B = b|x0, y0, λ) = δa′b. This
vanishes for b 6= a′, and so p(A = a|x0, y0, λ) = 0 for a 6= a′ from Eq. (13), yielding
p(A = a|x0, y0, λ) = δa′a. Thus the measurement outcomes are deterministic, as
claimed in Proposition 2.
The case of continuous outcomes is more subtle, noting that Eq. (12) does
not generalise to p(A = B|x0, y0, λ) =
∫
da p(a, a|x0, y0, λ): the right hand side
is not a probability, and indeed it diverges for perfectly correlated cases such as
p(a, b|x0, y0, λ) = δ(a)δ(b). Instead, one has
p(A = B|x0, y0, λ) := lim
ǫ→0
p(|A−B| < ǫ |x0, y0, λ)
=
∫
da p(a|x0, y0, λ) lim
ǫ→0
∫
{b:|b−a|<ǫ}
db p(b|x0, y0, λ), (14)
where the last line follows assuming outcome independence as per Eq. (7). Equa-
tion (13) therefore generalises to
p(a|x0, y0, λ)
[
1− lim
ǫ→0
∫
{b:|b−a|<ǫ}
db p(b|x0, y0, λ)
]
= 0 (15)
with probability 1. Essentially the same argument as for the discrete case may now
be applied. First, p(a|x0, y0, λ) > 0 for at least one value, and therefore the limit
in Eq. (15) must be unity for this value, a = a′ say, implying that p(b|x0, y0, λ)
is fully supported on {b : |b − a′| < ǫ} with probability 1, for all ǫ > 0, i.e.,
p(b|x0, y0, λ) = δ(b − a′). But this vanishes for b 6= a′, implying from Eq. (15)
that p(a|x0, y0, λ) = 0 for a 6= a′, and hence that p(a|x0, y0, λ) = δ(a − a′).
Thus, again, the measurement outcomes are determininistic with probability 1,
and Proposition 2 follows.
3 Can the EPR argument be considered complete?
Bell’s 1964 two-sentence derivation of determinism from locality and perfect cor-
relation, as quoted in section 2.2 above, is certainly incomplete. In particular, as
evidenced by Proposition 1, it is not supported by the only explicit form of locality
discussed in that paper, and must therefore rely on some other unstated assump-
tion. While either of local causality or outcome independence would do the job, as
implied by Proposition 2, it is natural to ask, given that Bell claims his derivation
is a version of the EPR argument, whether his unstated assumption can in fact be
deduced from the original EPR paper. This is the subject of this section.
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3.1 Logic of the EPR argument
The derivation of determinism via perfect correlation in the EPR paper begins
with a simple sufficient condition for an element of reality, quoted here [27]:
Definition 3 (EPR reality criterion) : If, without in any way disturbing a
system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the
value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corre-
sponding to this physical quantity.
This condition is then applied to cases of perfect correlation as per Eq. (4) (and
in particular to perfect position and momentum correlations), using the following
logic (see also section 2 of [45]):
1. Assume measurement x0 is made in a first region, with result a (assumption).
2. The outcome of a measurement y0 in a distant second region can then be
predicted as b = a with certainty (perfect correlation).
3. This prediction can be obtained without disturbing the distant region in any
way (assumption).
4. Hence, the value of b is an element of physical reality, prior to any actual
measurement of y0 in the distant region (EPR reality criterion).
The above steps are all that EPR explicitly use to derive reality/determinism for
any given perfect correlation. However, when one tries to make the above steps
mathematically rigorous, a gap shows up in the above logic. Indeed, as will be
shown via counterexamples below, the EPR reality criterion is in fact insufficient
for concluding the reality of b via these steps: a further assumption is required.
Moreover, EPR go on to consider what can be said if there are two or more
perfectly correlated pairs of measurements, and add the following further step:
5. If x1 and y1 are a second pair of perfectly correlated measurements, for the
first and second regions respectively, then applying the same steps as above
implies that the outcomes of both y0 and y1 are real and predetermined.
EPR rely on this last step to conclude that the incompleteness of quantum me-
chanics follows from their reality criterion [27]. However, as is also shown via a
counterexample below, Step 5 does not strictly follow as a logical consequence of
Steps 1–4: there is a second missing assumption. It follows that
Proposition 4 : The logic of the EPR argument for the incompleteness of quan-
tum mechanics is itself incomplete, i.e.,
EPR reality criterion 6=⇒ incompleteness of QM. (16)
Thus, comparing with Proposition 3, it is seen that the EPR reality criterion is
not as strong as outcome independence in this regard. Not all is lost, however. In
particular, it is not difficult to formulate a stronger form of the reality criterion
that allows the EPR argument to go through.
3.2 Counterexamples to the EPR logic
The EPR logic, as summarised above, has two important gaps which prevent
Steps 4 and 5, respectively, from going through without additional assumptions,
and lead to Proposition 4. These gaps relate to symmetry and joint measurements,
and are best illuminated via counterexamples.
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3.2.1 The asymmetry gap
The first gap in the EPR logic is relatively minor, and arises from the inherent
asymmetry of the argument: it requires only that a measurement made in the first
region does not disturb the system in the second region in any way, as per Step 3
(e.g., “at the time of measurement . . . no real change can take place in the second
system in consequence of anything that may be done to the first system” [27]).
This does not rule out, however, the possibility that making a measurement in the
second region can disturb the system in the first region. Note this is consistent
with no direct interaction between the two systems if it is the measurement device
that is responsible for the disturbance.
One class of counterexamples that exploits this gap is to allow (faster-than-
light) signalling from the second region to the first region, but not vice versa:
Example 1 : Suppose that each region contains a single spin-1
2
particle in a totally
mixed state, and that if a device measures spin in the y direction of the second
particle, with result b, it sends a signal (e.g., superluminally or along its backward
lightcone) that puts the first particle into a −b eigenstate of spin in the y direction.
Hence, if a measurement of spin in the x direction is made in the first region, the
statistics of the singlet state are reproduced, i.e., p(a, b|x,y) = 1
4
(1− abx · y).
Note for this example, choosing y0 = ±x0, that the outcome in the second re-
gion can be predicted with probability unity from the result of a measurement
in the first region, and that there is no disturbance of the second region by any
measurement carried out in the first region, thus fulfilling the conditions for the
EPR reality criterion. Nevertheless, contrary to Step 4 of the EPR logic, there is
no pre-existing element of reality for the outcome of a measurement in the second
region: a totally random and unpredictable result b = ±1 is obtained for any spin
direction y. Thus, use of the EPR reality criterion fails for this example, implying
that the EPR logic is incomplete without some further assumption. Note that if
the spin measurements are replaced by linear polarisations, for a two-photon state,
then the two initial states can be replaced by eigenstates of circular polarisation.
An interesting second class of counterexamples exploiting the asymmetry gap
is temporal in nature, and applies to the case of a single particle:
Example 2 : Suppose, a single spin-1
2
particle is initally described by a maximally
mixed state, and that the second region lies within the past lightcone of the first
region. Suppose further that a measurement of spin in some direction, if made
in the second region, acts to leave the particle in an eigenstate of spin in that
direction. Hence, if the same spin direction is subsequently measured in the first
region, the results are perfectly correlated.
Thus, the outcome in the second region can be predicted from the result of a
measurement made in the first region and, assuming no retrocausality, it is impos-
sible for any measurement in the first region to disturb the second region in any
way, as required by the EPR reality criterion. Yet there is no pre-existing element
of reality for the outcome in the second region, contrary to Step 4 of the EPR
argument.
Classical examples can also be obtained by replacing the particles in the above
examples by classical models thereof [1]. One way to close the asymmetry gap is
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simply to symmetrise the EPR logic, by further assuming that measurement y0 is
made in the second region, without disturbing the first region in any way (which
has the additional advantage that one can also obtain the reality of the outcome
of x0, via Steps 1–4 with the roles of x0 and y0 reversed). It turns out, however,
that this assumption is too strong in that it prevents closure of a second gap.
3.2.2 The joint measurement gap
To expose the second (and most important) gap in the EPR argument (see also
section 2 of [45]), observe that the logic starts with the assumption in Step 1
that x0 is measured. Without this assumption the value of b cannot be predicted
with certainty, as required for Steps 2 and 4. It follows that, even ignoring (or in
some way closing) the asymmetry gap, one cannot proceed directly from Step 4
to Step 5. In particular, for a second pair of perfectly correlated measurements x1
and y1, one can only conclude that the outcomes of both y0 and y1 are real and
predetermined if both x0 and x1 are measured without disturbing the predicted
perfect correlations. Conversely, if they cannot both be so measured, then Step 5
does not logically follow (without some additional assumption). Note that this
issue is only exacerbated if the asymmetry gap is closed as per the method of the
previous subsection, as Step 5 would then require that both y0 and y1 are also
measured, without disturbing the correlations.
In his response to the EPR paper, Bohr famously gave an explicit quantum
counterexample exploiting this joint measurement gap, by showing how perfect
momentum and position correlations between two quantum particles cannot both
be maintained as soon as either the position or momentum of one particle is mea-
sured [46] (note that the fourth and fifth pages, describing the counterexample,
are printed in reverse order). The singlet state measurements considered by Bell
supply a similar counterexample (since a Stern-Gerlach magnet cannot simulta-
neously have two measurement orientations), and one can also construct classical
counterexamples [47].
EPR allude to the joint measurement gap in the penultimate paragraph of
their paper, when they reject a possible replacement of their reality criterion by a
more restrictive criterion for the reality of the momentum P and position Q of a
particle in the second region [27]:
“Indeed, one would not arrive at our conclusion if one insisted that two or
more physical quantities can be regarded as simultaneous elements of reality
only when they can be simultaneously measured or predicted. . . . This makes
the reality of P and Q depend upon the process of measurement carried
out on the first system, which does not disturb the second system in any
way. No reasonable definition of reality could be expected to permit this.”
This quote suggests a possible method for closing the joint measurement gap: by
making the ‘reasonable’ assumption that the reality of a physical quantity in a
given region is independent of any measurement that does not in any way disturb
that region (note that this assumption would represent a necessary condition for
an element of reality, in contrast to the sufficient condition given by the EPR
reality criterion). Thus, if Steps 1–4 are taken to be valid, then the reality of both
y0 and y1 must still hold even if neither of the non-disturbing measurements of x0
and x1 are actually made. However, this assumption is too weak to also close the
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asymmetry gap, which prevents Step 4 from being used to actually conclude the
reality of y0 (or y1) even in the case that x0 (or x1) is measured. In particular,
the assumption can only be applied once the reality of the outcome of y0 (or y1)
has actually been established.
3.3 Closing the gaps: a stronger reality criterion
It is clear from the counterexamples of the previous subsection that the EPR
reality criterion is not strong enough to derive the incompleteness of quantum
mechanics, as per Proposition 4. It is further clear that the common issue arising
from the gaps identified by these counterexamples is the need for stronger notions
of non-disturbance and reality. A natural solution to this issue is to minimally
strengthen the EPR reality criterion as follows.
Definition 4 (Local reality criterion) : If, without in any way disturbing or
being disturbed by a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability
equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists, prior to the
prediction, an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.
The italicised phrases indicate additions to the original EPR reality criterion in
Definition 3, and close the asymmetry and joint measurement gaps respectively.
Note that they correspond to a weakening of the method of closing the asymmetry
gap considered in section 3.2.1 (a direct measurement of y0 is not required), and
to a strengthening of the method of closing the joint measurement gap considered
in section 3.2.2 (the reality of the outcome does not require the prediction to have
actually been established by some suitable measurement).
It is shown here that this stronger criterion of local reality restores the desired
logical completeness of the EPR argument, i.e., in contrast to Proposition 4:
Proposition 5
local reality criterion =⇒ incompleteness of standard QM, (17)
It is further shown that one can rigorously obtain:
Proposition 6
local reality criterion+ perfect correlation =⇒ weak locality + determinism,
(18)
as required by Bell for his 1964 paper. Hence it is natural to identify the unstated
assumption in that paper with the local reality criterion. Notet that Proposition 6
is also valid if the local reality criterion is replaced by local causality as per Eq. (6).
Thus this criterion is also closely related to the assumption used to derive general
Bell inequalities [2,6,41,42].
The proof of Proposition 5 is straightforward. First, the EPR logic for pairs
of perfectly correlated measurements x0, y0 and x1, y1 is modified as follows (with
primes and italics indicating modified steps):
1. Assume measurement x0 is made in a first region, with result a (assumption).
2. The outcome of a measurement y0 in a distant second region can then be
predicted as b = a with certainty (perfect correlation).
12 Michael J. W. Hall
3′. This prediction can be obtained without disturbing or being disturbed by the
distant region in any way (assumption).
4′. Hence, the value of b is an element of physical reality, prior to any actual
measurement of y0 in the distant region, and prior to obtaining the prediction
via an actual measurement of x0 (local reality criterion).
5′. If x1 and y1 are a second pair of perfectly correlated measurements, for the
first and second regions respectively, then applying the same steps as above
implies that the outcomes of both y0 and y1 are real and predetermined prior
to any actual measurement of x0 or x1.
Note that Step 3′ rules out the counterexamples in section 3.2.1, and Step 4′ rules
out those in section 3.2.2.
The above logic is sufficient to obtain Proposition 5, using either the perfectly
correlated momentum and position wave function considered by EPR or the sin-
glet state considered by Bell. It also sufficient for the determinism component of
Proposition 6. However, the weak locality component of the latter requires a little
more work, including several uses of the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 : If the conditional distribution of a random variable j is deterministic
for given prior information k (i.e., p(j|k) = 0 for all but one value of j), then it
remains deterministic when conditioned on any further information l compatible
with k (i.e., p(j|k, l) = 0 for all but one value of j).
Proof : We have p(j|k) = 0 for all j 6= j0, for some j0, and p(l|k) > 0. Hence
0 ≤ p(j, l|k) ≤ p(j|k) = 0 for j 6= j0, and so, using the standard rules of probability,
p(j|k, l) = p(j, l|k)/p(l|k) = 0 for all j 6= j0.
To prove Proposition 6, note first from Step 4′ above that the outcome of
y0 is predetermined prior to any measurement of x0 or y0. Let λ
′
0 denote any
additional variables needed to determine this outcome, i.e., p(b|a, x0, y0, λ′0) = 0
for all but the predetermined value of b. Further, from Step 3′, actually making a
measurement of x0 in the first region cannot affect this predetermined outcome,
i.e., x0 and a are redundant in determining its value, and hence p(b|a,x0, y0, λ′0)
= p(b|y0, λ′0) = 0 for all but one value of b.
Second, suppose that in fact some other measurement, x say, rather than x0,
is actually made in the first region, without disturbing the second region in any
way. Then, since we have p(b|y0, λ′0) = 0 for all but one value of b, and x must be
compatible with y0 and λ
′
0 if it is actually made, it follows from the Lemma that
p(b|x, y0, λ′0) = p(b|y0, λ′0) = 0 (19)
for all but one value of b and any such measurement. Similarly, reversing the roles
of the first and second regions, and letting λ′′0 denote any additional information
needed to determine the outcome of x0, it also follows that
p(a|x0, y, λ′′0 ) = p(a|x0, λ′′0 ) = 0 (20)
for all but one value of a and any measurement y made in the second region that
does not disturb the first region.
Third, suppose there is some set of perfectly correlated pairs of measurements,
{(xs, ys) : s ∈ S}, for some index set S, where the measurement in each region
Does locality plus perfect correlation imply determinism? 13
does not disturb and is not disturbed in any way by the measurement in the other
region. Using an obvious notation, the above two equations then generalise to
p(b|xs, yt, λ′t) = p(b|yt, λ′t) = 0, p(a|xs, yt, λ′′s ) = p(a|yt, λ′′s ) = 0
for all but one value of a and b and all s, t ∈ S. Hence, letting λ denote the set of
pairs {(λ′s, λ′′s ) : s ∈ S}, application of the above Lemma immediately gives
p(a|xs, yt, λ) = p(a|xs, λ) = 0, p(b|xs, yt, λ) = p(b|yt, λ) = 0 (21)
for all but one value of a and b and all s, t ∈ S. Thus, the outcomes of all pairs
(xs, yt) are deterministic, and satisfy weak locality as per Eq. (2), thereby proving
Proposition (6).
4 Implications for quantum interpretations and locality
4.1 Completeness of quantum interpretations
While not as strong as Bell inequalities in their physical consequences, Proposi-
tions 3 and 5 are nevertheless significant for various interpretations of quantum
phenomena, as briefly noted below.
First, any interpretations that rely exclusively on the standard Hilbert space
description, such as the Copenhagen [48], many worlds [49,50], consistent his-
tories [51], spontaneous collapse [52,53], relational quantum mechanics [54] and
QBist [55] interpretations, necessarily reject outcome independence (and thus clas-
sical common causes): probabilities calculated from states on Hilbert space do not
factorise as per Eq. (7). Thus these interpretations are not subject to a charge of
incompleteness via Proposition 3.
However, any such interpretation must further reject the local reality criterion
in Definition 4, if it is to also maintain completeness in the light of Proposition 5. A
common approach is to reject the existence of an element of reality prior to being
able to make a prediction with probability unity. For example, in the many worlds
interpretation such a prediction cannot be made until a measurement establishes
the relevant branch (or memory sequence) of the observer making the predic-
tion [50], while in the Copenhagen interpretation Bohr emphasises there is “an
influence on the very conditions which define the possible types of predictions re-
garding the future behavior of the system . . . [where] these conditions constitute an
inherent element of the description of any phenomenon to which the term ‘physical
reality’ can be properly attached” [46] (his italics). Another approach is to assert
the reality of wave function collapse, thus implying a disturbance of one region by
measurement in another, as in spontaneous collapse interpretations [52,53] (and
in some variants of the Copenhagen interpretation, albeit explicitly rejected by
Bohr [46]: “Of course there is in a case like that just considered no question of a
mechanical disturbance of the system under investigation”—see also [56]).
In contrast, interpretations which either supplement or replace standard quan-
tum theory with a deterministic description of outcomes, such as the deBroglie-
Bohm [57,58], many-interacting-worlds [59,60] and superdeterministic [61,62] in-
terpretations, treat standard quantum mechanics as incomplete from the outset,
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and hence are untroubled by Propositions 3 and 5. Note that any such interpre-
tation automatically satisfies outcome independence (deterministic models neces-
sarily satisfy Eq. (7)), and may or may not satisfy the local reality criterion. For
example, for the case of perfect position and momentum correlations considered
by EPR, both the deBroglie-Bohm and many-interacting-worlds interpretations
satisfy this criterion for position measurements (the positions of all particles are
‘real’), but not for momentum measurements (such measurements on one par-
ticle necessarily disturb the other particle, directly via a nonlocal influence in
the deBroglie-Bohm interpretation [58], and indirectly via interactions with other
worlds in the many-interacting-worlds approach [60]). In contrast, the local real-
ity criterion is always satisfied in superdeterministic interpretations (as is local
causality), as these give a measurement-dependent explanation of quantum corre-
lations in terms of local classical common causes, which not only determine the
measurement outcomes but the measurement selections themselves [61,62].
4.2 Is outcome independence a locality property?
As noted in the Introduction, Bell’s claim that determinism follows from locality
and perfect correlations would further suggest, in the light of his 1964 inequality [1],
that quantum mechanics is necessarily nonlocal. While debate on this question is
also extensive (see, e.g., [9,15,28]–[36]), it largely centres around different possible
definitions of ‘locality’ [15] and so, in the spirit of avoiding ‘woolly interpretive
commentary’ as per the Introduction, will not be reviewed here. Nevertheless,
some basic points are made below that help clarify some aspects, including an
example of local classical indeterminism with perfect correlations.
First, standard quantum mechanics is certainly local in the sense of weak lo-
cality: operations carried out in one region cannot affect the statistics in a distant
region [63,64]. Any claim of nonlocality must therefore rely on a different sense (or
on an interpretation that goes beyond the standard quantum description). Second,
the local reality criterion in section 3.3 clearly involves notions of both locality and
reality, and hence its failure cannot unambiguously rule out locality. Third, the
violation of Bell inequalities by quantum correlations do not necessarily rule out
locality in the strong sense of local causality as per Eq. (6), unless one further
assumes measurement independence [65]. Fourth, even under the assumption of
measurement independence, local causality is equivalent to the combination of
weak locality and outcome independence, and hence its failure corresponds to an
unambiguous signature of nonlocality if and only if the failure of outcome inde-
pendence is also such a signature. But is this the case?
The answer to the above question is, prima facie, negative. Outcome inde-
pendence can be interpreted purely in terms of classical common causes [7] or
completeness [37], and hence any violation can be taken to correspond to, for ex-
ample, the existence of nonclassical common causes, rather than to some type of
nonlocality. Further, while Shimony refers to the failure of outcome independence
as an ‘uncontrollable nonlocality’ [28], the nature of this nonlocality is only in
the vague and unexplained sense of ‘passion at a distance’ (amusingly criticised
by Mermin as ‘fashion at a distance’ [30]). These points do not, however, strictly
rule out the possibility that some overlooked and unambiguous nonlocal effect is
associated with the failure of outcome independence. In this context it is of inter-
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est to note the existence of classical examples that further curtail this possibility,
based on systems in classical mechanics and electrodynamics that are inherently
nondeterministic [66,67,68,69].
For example, consider two classical particles of massmmoving in one dimension
under a potential of the form
V (x1, x2) =
{
−γ |x1 − x2|3/2, |x1 − x2| ≤ d,
−γ d3/2, |x1 − x2| > d, (22)
where d is some fixed separation distance beyond which the particles do not inter-
act. If the particles are initially at rest at the origin, i.e., x˙1(0) = x˙2(0) = 0, then
conservation of energy in the centre of mass frame corresponds to 1
4
mx˙2−γ|x|3/2 =
0 for separations x = x1 − x2 less than d, and free motion for separations greater
than d. Remarkably, this system has the non-unique set of solutions:
xR(t) = −xL(t) =


0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
γ2
32m2 (t− T )4, T < t ≤ T + τ,
d
2
+
√
γ
md
3/4(t− T − τ), t > T + τ,
(23)
where xL and xR label the left-moving and right-moving particles, T ≥ 0 is arbi-
trary, and τ := 2(dm2/γ2)1/4. Thus the particles remain at the origin for time T ,
then repel each other for a fixed duration τ , and are noninteracting thereafter. The
evolution is therefore nondeterministic, since the ‘pause time’ T is not uniquely
fixed despite all forces and initial conditions being specified and well-defined.
Suppose now that two detectors are placed at equal distances greater than d/2
from the origin, and switched on at time t = 0. It follows that there is a perfect
correlation between their readouts at all times, irrespective of the value of T (there
is also a perfect correlation between the particle positions and momenta, up until
detection). We thus have a classical example of perfect correlations between two
noninteracting regions, in a nondeterministic context.
It follows via Propostion 6 that the local reality criterion in section 3.3 fails for
this example (as does the EPR reality criterion). Further, while outcome indepen-
dence cannot be directly assessed (the example is nonstatistical), it nevertheless
fails in the broad sense of being incompatible with Proposition 2 for this example.
It is clear that the these failures are not due to any nonlocal effect, but to the lack
of a classical cause for the pause time T , where this lack may itself be regarded as
form of incompleteness.
The above example of classical indeterminism corresponds to reinterpreting the
single-particle model in [68] as describing the relative displacement of two identical
particles initially at rest, and switching off the inter-particle interaction above a
specified separation distance to ensure locality. Similar examples can be obtained
via the single-particle models in [67], while an inherently local and relativistic
example is provided by a weakly bound system of a classical electromagnetic field
and two identical classical particles in two-dimensional spacetime [66,69]. It would
be of interest to determine whether the model of indeterministic classical motion
suggested by Gisin can provide further examples [70] (although it is not clear how
to satisfactorily obtain perfect correlations via conservation laws in this model).
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5 Conclusions
Bell’s “insistence that the determinism was inferred rather than assumed” [6],
via the combination of locality and perfect correlation in his 1964 paper, is not
supported by the only form of locality considered in that paper (weak locality
is simply too weak), nor by an appeal to the EPR paper (the incompleteness
argument therein is itself incomplete), as per Propositions 1 and 4. It is interesting
in this regard that Bell did not back up his claim by spelling out any details of how
determinism might be rigorously derived. Indeed, when revisiting the example of
perfect spin correlations in section 3 of his 1981 paper [6], he merely states that “we
seem obliged to admit that the results on both sides are determined in advance” (my
italics). Likewise, in earlier papers he states only, for example, that “This strongly
suggests that the outcomes of such measurements, along arbitrary directions, are
actually determined in advance” [71]; or asks “Is it not more reasonable to assume
that the result was somehow predetermined all along?” [72] (my italics).
It follows in any case, from Proposition 1, that an extra assumption of some
sort, either additional to or in place of weak locality, is required to derive deter-
minism from perfect correlation (see also [15,25]). Further, as first noted by van
Fraassen [7], the assumption of outcome independence is sufficient for this purpose
(whether or not weak locality or local causality or even measurement independence
holds) and, moreover, is even sufficient to derive the incompleteness of quantum
mechanics, as reviewed in Propositions 2 and 3.
It similarly follows that the EPR incompleteness argument requires an addi-
tional assumption of some sort, to avoid the asymmetry and joint measurement
gaps identified in section 3.2. Strengthening the EPR reality criterion to the local
reality criterion in Definition 4 is sufficient for this purpose, as per Proposition 5.
Moreover, the strengthened criterion is also sufficient, when combined with perfect
correlation, to imply both weak locality and determinism as per Proposition 6, as
required for deriving Bell’s original inequality. Given Bell’s appeal to the EPR
argument to support his claim, the local reality criterion is therefore a natural
candidate for the unstated assumption in his 1964 paper.
As noted in section 4, the completeness of quantum mechanics can be main-
tained by all interpretations that rely exclusively on the standard Hilbert space
description. Locality can also be maintained, in the absence of any evidence that
the failure of outcome independence corresponds to an unambiguous signature of
nonlocality. Indeed, if we follow van Fraassen in interpreting outcome indepen-
dence as corresponding to classical common causes, it follows that its failure in
standard quantum mechanics instead corresponds to the existence of nonclassical
common causes. In this regard it is of interest to note that some quantitative dis-
tinctions between classical, quantum, and nonclassical common causes have been
recently identified [73].
Finally, it is well known that the experimental violation of Bell inequalities
requires that models of quantum correlations give up at least one of weak locality,
outcome independence or measurement independence. But stronger conclusions
can be obtained by finding experimental tests that relax at least one of these
assumptions. For example, a relaxed Bell inequality has recently been given [74]
and experimentally tested [75] for models satisfying measurement independence
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but which relax weak locality and outcome independence to the weaker condition
p(a, b|x, y, λ) = wA→Bλ p(a|x, λ) p(b|a, y, λ) + wB→Aλ p(a|b, x, λ) p(b|y, λ) (24)
for all x, y, λ, where wA→Bλ +w
B→A
λ = 1. Thus, the measurement x in a first region
can influence the statistics of b in a second region via its outcome a (with some
probability wA→Bλ ), while the measurement y in the second region can influence
the statistics of a in the first region via its outcome b (with probability wB→Aλ ).
Violations of a relaxed Bell inequality for such models, by some quantum systems,
show that some quantum correlations cannot be described even if weak locality
and outcome independence are relaxed to this extent [74,75]. In contrast, the
simple one-particle example used to prove Proposition 3 suggests the possibility
of semi-device independent tests of models that are only constrained by outcome
and measurement independence (i.e., allowing weak locality to be fully relaxed),
based on modifying the example to allow approximate perfect correlations. This
will be investigated elsewhere.
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